








The external representation of the EU: A simple 




I. WHAT THE LISBON TREATY SAYS   
In the Lisbon treaty (TEU) three main actors 
have been designated to represent the European 
Union on the international scene: The President 
of the European Council, the President of the 
European Commission, and the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.  
From 1974 until November 2009, when the 
Lisbon treaty entered into force, the European 
Council was presided by the head of state or 
government of the rotating presidency, clearly 
designated as head of delegation for all bilateral 
summits between the EU and third countries. 
The big innovation introduced by the TEU was 
the institution of a stable presidency of the 
European Council elected for a two and a half 
year term, renewable once (article 15, para.5 
TEU). The purpose of this innovation was to 
reinforce the visibility and continuity of the 
European Council’s presidency, which became an 
“Sofagate” has brutally disclosed the internal 
divergences within the EU in the field of its external 
relations.   
 
Some tried to minimize this unfortunate incident as a 
mere breach of diplomatic protocol.  However, several 
elements lead us to think that the issue at stake is a very 
political matter: the division of power between the 
President of the EU Commission and the President of 
the European Council concerning the external 
representation of the EU.  
 
Tensions between both presidents were predictable 
and identified as soon as the Lisbon Treaty came into 
force (see premonitory analysis written by Professor 
Niki Aloupi in 2010) 1 . The ambivalent language of the 
Lisbon treaty seems to be the main source of these 
tensions which had, until now, been contained. On 6 
of April 2021, these misgivings became public as 
pictures of the Ankara meeting, amplified by social 
media, went viral.  
 
Considering the complex relationship between 
institutions and Member states as well as the harsh 
criticism from Eurosceptical populists, an institutional 
quarrel is the last thing the EU needs in these 
COVID-19 times. This awkward dispute undermines 
the ambitions for an efficient and coherent European 
foreign policy.  
 
This article focuses solely on the impact of the incident 
on the internal structure of the EU’s external 
representation.  
 
It provides an analysis of the dysfunction, why it 
happened, and how it could be fixed. 
 
This paper does not comment on the role of 









official institution of the Union (article 13 TEU). 
According to article 15, para. 6 “The President of 
the European Council shall, at his level and in 
that capacity, ensure the external representation 
of the Union on issues concerning its common 
foreign and security policy, without prejudice to 
the powers of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.”   
For matters other than foreign affairs and 
security policy (CFSP), the Commission ensures 
(as an institution, not as a person) the external 
representation of the Union (Article 17 TEU). 
The suppression of the so-called pillars and the 
attribution of a legal personality to the Union 
have reinforced the Commission’s role in the 
external representation of the EU in community 
matters. Besides the CFSP exception, there is the 
particular case of the external representation of 
the eurozone, which is ensured by the president 
of the Eurogroup (an informal body). Just as the 
President of the European Council, the President 
of the European Commission is a full member of 
the European Council and the counterpart of 
Heads of State and government in matters 
relating to the competences of the Commission.  
The High Representative (HR) conducts the 
Union’s common foreign policy, represents the 
EU in political dialogues with third countries and 
within international organizations and 
conferences and in all matters related to the 
European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
He presides over the Foreign Affairs Council 
(Articles 18 and 27 of the TEU) and, as one of 
the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, ensures 
the consistency of the EU’s external action.  
Unsound competition  
As anyone can see, the tasks of the designated 
actors in charge of the EU’s foreign policy were 
not clearly defined. The possibility of 
competition between these actors could not be 
excluded since the definition of shared 
competences between the EU and its Member 
States was not unambiguous. In fact, the reason 
why the external representation of the EU 
remains difficult to grasp, is the reluctance of 
Member States to transfer the exercise of their 
national foreign policy to the Union.  
The Presidency of the European Council was 
modelled on the role of a head of state in a classic 
parliamentary regime, not as politically exposed 
as a head of government. However, nothing in 
the TEU prevents an assertive personality of 
fulfilling his/her tasks with dynamism and taking 
the necessary initiatives to make the role look 
more presidential. The lack of precision in the 
manner in which the job description is drafted 
allows the President of the European Council to 
take advantage of any opportunity to compete 
with the President of the Commission. This 
loophole was detected and criticized by the 
representatives of smaller Member States – 
including Belgium- that considered it a way of 
weakening the Commission.   
When dealing with the external competences of 
the Union, the EU treaties have always made a 
clear distinction between those of an 
intergovernmental nature (which require 
unanimity as is the case with CFSP/CSDP) and 
those of an exclusively community nature (such 
as trade policy, cooperation and development, 
and humanitarian assistance). In practice, this 
distinction is not as obvious as it seems. In most 
cases, when dealing with foreign policy, the  
Commission and the Council will inevitably 
depend on one another. Ultimately, the efficiency 
of the EU’s foreign policy is determined by the 
personal relationship and compatibility of the 
respective ambitions of the President of the 












II. POLITICS NOT PROTOCOL. 
Calling upon protocol rules to justify primacy in the 
external representation of the Union is not a 
convincing argument.   
Article 13, para.1 TEU enumerates the institutions 
of the Union without explicitly indicating any order 
of precedence. Besides the ambiguity of the treaty, 
protocol arrangements in the EU are based on 
customary practices, not on legally binding texts. The 
practical arrangements referred to as “protocol 
rules” are, in fact, guidelines with no political 
meaning provided by the protocol services of either 
institution2. The informal document entitled 
“Practical Arrangements between President Van 
Rompuy and President Barroso regarding External 
Representation of the European Union at 
Presidential Level”, signed on 16 March 2010, 
proves this point. This written gentlemen’s 
agreement had to be negotiated because of the 
absence of a formal EU protocol book.   
Furthermore, the role of the European Council and 
of the European Commission concerning the 
management of the financial, migration, BREXIT 
and COVID-19 crises was not defined by protocol 
considerations. The way the eurozone crisis or the 
compromise with Turkey on migration were 
managed are particularly telling in this regard. These 
challenges generated a lot of expectations towards 
the decision-making capacity of European leaders 
and European institutions. On many occasions both 
had to “improvise” to use the expression of Luuk 
Van Middelaar 3. 
Whereas the Lisbon Treaty is relatively silent and 
ambiguous on precedence arrangements, it is very 
clear on how institutions should work together. The 
purpose of the TEU’s innovations was precisely to 
reinforce the external representation of the 
European Union in terms of visibility and efficiency. 
Coherence and unity in representation are the main 
tools Member States and the EU institutions should 
use to increase the relevance of EU foreign policy.   
The coherence principle is repeatedly mentioned in 
the TEU (Role of the General Affairs Council article 
16, para.6; Role of the High Representative in article 
18, para.4; Coherence/cooperation in article 21, 
para.3 and Common Foreign and Security Policy in 
article 26, para.2). The loyal cooperation between 
institutions is specifically mentioned in article 13, 
para.2 of the treaty. This principle does not only 
apply for EU institutions, but also for EU Member 
States (Article 4, para.3).   
This cooperation principle, which can be interpreted 
as a code of conduct or as an obligation to reach a 
particular result was designed to ensure a strong 
representation of the EU on the international scene. 
This is the principle which was violated during the 
diplomatic incident in Ankara.  
Individuals profiles 
Since the TEU entered into force, Member States 
have been careful not to select personalities who 
would have boosted the autonomy of the 
Commission or the European Council. Their 
reluctance towards a supranational approach of the 
external representation of the Union confirms the 
traditional will of European heads of state and 
government to keep control over the EU’s foreign 
policy.   
One of the ironies in the implementation of the 
Lisbon treaty is that the same Member States that 
pleaded for the upgrading of the EU’s role in the 
world were also the ones that made sure that the 
selected personalities would not be able to challenge 
them. This was the result of a compromise between 
large and smaller Member States – yet another 
example of the ambivalent identity of the EU in 
which the community and intergovernmental 
methods coexist, sometimes in a complementary 
and sometimes in a competing manner.    
The same ambivalence is visible in the EU’s 
governance, especially in times of crisis. While the 
Commission represents the supranational aspect of 








reflects the intergovernmental aspect of European 
governance and remains as such the supreme 
decision-making body of the Union.   
The internal structure of the EU’s external 
representation has more in common with the way a 
state is organized than with an intergovernmental 
organization. But, even if their powers are larger than 
those of leaders of international organisations, the 
President of the European Council and the President 
of the European Commission remain high-ranking 
civil servants. None of them is the embodiment of 
the external expression of a (non-existing) European 
Sovereignty.  The “geopolitical Commission” is an 
abstract notion and the President of the European 
Council remains the chairman of the European 
Council, not the President of Europe. Donald Tusk 
used to refer to himself as “the European 
Bureaucrat-in-Chief.” 4 
The foreseeable future  
In a rational world one would have thought that the 
three designated actors in charge of the external 
representation of the Union would work together 
using the flexibilities of the Lisbon treaty, sharing 
between them in the most efficient way the heavy 
workload of the EU’s foreign policy.   
Given the sensitivity of Member States on this 
matter one would have expected more discretion 
from the representatives of European institutions 
when dealing with their internal disagreements. 
Previous presidential teams (Van Rompuy/Barroso 
and Tusk/Juncker) managed to do so even in times 
of crisis.  
The diplomatic incident that occurred in Ankara has 
hurt the credibility of both presidents as well as the 
credibility of the European Union. Concepts such as 
“European Sovereignty”, “Strategic autonomy” and 
“team Europe”, on which the EU’s strategy for the 
fight against the COVID-19 pandemic is based, 
could also suffer collateral damage.  
Witnessing the EU’s foreign policy taken hostage by 
a quarrel between the persons tasked to represent the 
Union and its Member States is rather odd.   
Merging the Presidency of the European Council 
with the Presidency of the Commission could be a 
radical solution to deal with this awkward situation. 
The idea is not new. It came up during the 
Convention more than 20 years ago. Jean-Claude 
Juncker mentioned it during his last state of the 
Union. From a legal perspective, some experts argue 
that this could be done without a treaty change. 
However, from a political perspective the “single 
presidency” of the European Union is far too risky. 
It could either lead to a Federal Union governed by 
the European Commission or risk downgrading the 
EU, which would become an intergovernmental 
organization with the Commission as its secretariat. 
EU Member States are not ready for either option.  
The poor performance of the EU’s external policy 
requires rapid reaction, to be pushed by the heads of 
state and government. Time is of the essence and the 
EU cannot wait for the negotiation of yet another 
inter-institutional agreement, let alone for the results 
of the Conference on the Future of Europe.    
The adoption by the European Council of a decision 
based on a common understanding between the 
President of the European Council and the President 
of the European Commission, which would 
streamline the external action of the European 
Union on a case-by-case basis, seems feasible. What 
the external representation of the Union would lose 
in terms of fluidity and reactivity, would be 
compensated by gains in terms of coherence and 
credibility.  
Unfortunately, this does not seem the most likely 
scenario.  
With Heads of State and government fully focused 
on the COVID-19 pandemic, the implementation of 
the Recovery and Resilience Plans, the twin 
green/digital transitions and - in the case of 








it is hard to imagine the next VIDEOEUCO starting 
with some form of admonishment followed by the 
smooth adoption of the decision mentioned above.  
More likely the member states will let the presidents 
of both institutions deal with this “protocol 
problem”. Left to themselves no one knows how 
long it will take to agree on a common understanding 
for practical arrangements. The first audition by the 
EP political groups was not very promising.   
The intervention of the European Parliament and 
the hearing, organized behind closed doors, by the 
Conference of the Presidents is another anomaly in 
the follow-up of the now infamous “sofagate”. In 
principle, the President of the European Council is 
not accountable to the European Parliament and 
certainly not on CFSP matters. The President of the 
European Council is only accountable to the 
European Council, which can end the President’s 
term by qualified majority in case of serious 
misconduct (article 15, para.2), whereas the 
Commission as a body is accountable to the 
European Parliament, which may vote on a motion 
of censure against it. Some Member States will 
probably react to the implicit mediation role the 
Parliament wishes to endorse in this dispute.   
CONCLUSION 
The turmoil caused by the diplomatic incident that 
occurred in Turkey will be remembered for a long 
time by the protocol services.  
From an institutional perspective, this incident has 
damaged the external representation of the Union as 
it was conceived in the Lisbon Treaty. The 
possibilities offered by the TUE were wasted 
because of the personal rivalry between the President 
of the European Commission and the President of 




The only way out of this unsound competition 
seems to be the conclusion of a common 
understanding, which should be quickly drafted by 
the cabinets of both presidents in order to restore the 
credibility of the Union on the international scene.   
However, unlike the discreet arrangements 
concluded in 2010 between presidents Van Rompuy 
and Barroso, this common understanding will be 
scrutinized by the legal services of the EU 
institutions, as well as by Member States. This will 
inevitably formalize and complicate the negotiation.  
Member States - and in particular, the bigger ones – 
will never accept any modification of the rules 
concerning the external representation of the Union 
that would enter into force without their explicit 
consent and possibly to the detriment of the 
European Council – speeches on “European 
sovereignty” notwithstanding.   
François Roux,  
Senior Advisor  
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